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INTRODUCTION
Any attempt to understand religious rivalries in the ancient Mediterranean
world must take into account the social and political structures within
which such phenomena took place. Such structures influenced or con-
strained in various ways the activities and behaviours of the individuals,
groups, and communities that attract our historical interest. Thus, it is the
city or polis of the Greek East, and the larger power structures of which
the polis was a part, that should frame our investigations. It is important,
of course, to remember that, in focusing on the polis, we are glimpsing only
a small portion of social-religious life in antiquity; we are not studying life
in the countryside and villages, concerning which the evidence is, unfor-
tunately, far less abundant. Our understanding of the nature and charac-
teristics of the polis and empire will have an impact on our assessment of
social and religious life. For this reason, it is very important to be self-con-
scious about the models and presuppositions that have not only informed
past scholarship in this area but also, for better or for worse, continue to
shape our perceptions of civic life in regions like the Roman province of Asia.
It is common, in discussions of the polis under Hellenistic and Roman
rule, to read about the corrosion of civic spirit or identity, about interference
by ruling authorities, about the hollowness of civic institutions and struc-
tures, which are supposed to have accompanied a fundamental decline. In
recent years, some scholars have begun to question key aspects of this tra-
ditional scenario of decline. As we shall soon see, theories concerning the
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degeneration of the polis, including its religious life, are based more on a
debatable selection, interpretation, and employment of evidence—informed
by an underlying model of decline—than they are by the weight of the
evidence itself. Indeed, I shall argue that despite changes and develop-
ments in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, we can properly speak of the
continuing vitality of civic life, especially in its social and religious aspects.
I begin by discussing and questioning notions of decline in the study
of the polis (Models of Decline in the Study of the Polis), before outlining
ways in which this notion has influenced studies of ancient religious life
in this context (Models of Decline in the Study of Social-Religious Life). I
then provide evidence for the continuing vitality of civic life by using the
inscriptional evidence for small social-religious groups in the cities of
Roman Asia (Evidence for the Vitality of the Polis in Asia Minor). This evi-
dence gives us a glimpse into the importance of networks of benefaction,
and provides a picture of the polis as a locus of identity, pride, co-operation,
and competition among various levels of society. Finally, I discuss how this
overall picture of the polis might inform our discussion of religious rivalries
(Implications for the Study of Religious Rivalries).
MODELS OF DECLINE IN THE STUDY OF THE POLIS
Pausanias, the ancient travel guide, makes a sarcastic statement which
provides us with a rare description of how an ancient Greek defined the polis:
“From Chaironeia it is two and a half miles to the polis of Panopeus in
Phokis: if you can call it a polis when it has no civic offices, no gymnasium,
no theatre, and no market-place, when it has no running water at a foun-
tain and they live on the edge of a torrent in hovels like mountain huts. Still,
their territory has boundary stones, and they send delegates to the Phokian
assembly” (Pausanias, Descr. 10.4.1; trans. adapted from Levi 1971). Evi-
dently, Pausanias viewed the buildings and related institutions that accom-
panied civilized Hellenistic life as the essence of a Greek polis, and he
qualifies his sarcasm by noting that Panopeus did, at least, participate in
its regional political assembly. Conspicuously absent from Pausanias’s
description, however, is something that seems to be the focus of many
modern attempts to define what is or is not a real polis: the idea that with-
out true autonomy, or genuine democracy on the model of classical Athens,
there is no polis at all, or at best only a polis in decay.
According to the common view, changes that took place in the fourth
century BCE led to the failure of the Greek polis, followed by a steady degen-
eration of virtually every political, social, cultural, and other facet of civic
life in the Hellenistic and Roman periods (cf. Tarn and Griffith 1952, 47–125;
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Ehrenberg 1969 and 1965; Mossé 1973; Kreissig 1974; Ste. Croix 1981). A
particular interpretation and employment of two interrelated developments
form the basis for this view. First, the Hellenistic Age was a period in which
the authority of the kings over their territories brought true freedom to an
end and seriously undermined local autonomy through the rulers’ policy
of active interference in internal civic life. In this view, autonomy in its
strict sense is the essential ingredient without which the polis becomes an
empty shell, causing a corresponding decay in other dimensions of civic life
(cf. Finley 1977, 306–307; Thomas 1981, 40; Runciman 1990).
More often than not, the turning point of the loss of autonomy and,
hence, the beginning of the end of the polis, is placed either at the battle of
Chaironeia in 338 BCE—echoing Lykurgos’s statement that, “With the bod-
ies of [those who died at the battle] was buried the freedom of the other
Greeks” (Leoc. 50)—or at the beginning of the Hellenistic Age, at the death
of Alexander in 323 BCE (cf. Thomas 1981, 40). Other scholars, such A.H.M.
Jones (1940), argue that, although the Hellenistic era saw the beginning of
limited interference by the kings in civic life, thereby undermining self-gov-
ernment to some degree, such interference was limited and indirect. Jones
places the climax of such control and intervention five centuries or so later
than most other scholars, under the Roman emperors, especially empha-
sizing its negative impact on civic life from the second century CE onward.
Second, most scholars who speak of decline also focus on the sup-
posed degeneration of democracy and the declining role of the assembly
(ekklêsia) of the people (dêmos) (Ste. Croix 1981, 300–306, 518 ff., is repre-
sentative). While democracy in the classical period is thought to have per-
mitted the real participation of all strata of the population, giving even the
lower classes an avenue of political activity and a sense of belonging, there
is often presumed to have been a gradual disintegration of democracy in the
Hellenistic era, with a corresponding detachment, by the majority of the
population, from civic structures. The interfering policies of the Hellenis-
tic kings and, even more, the Roman emperors—especially their active
favouring of the establishment of oligarchic rule in the cities—assisted the
local elites in taking real power away from the people. Democracy by means
of the assembly of the people was already in “full decay” by the beginning
of the Roman era and, shortly thereafter, died out altogether, as G.E.M. de
Ste. Croix argues. Corresponding to the death of democracy was the detach-
ment of most inhabitants from civic identity or pride, especially in the
lower social strata of society.
There are several respects in which this overall scenario of decline is
exaggerated and inadequate. For this reason, some scholars have begun to
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deconstruct it. First of all, it seems that a broad set of assumptions and value
judgments plays a role in many scholars’ implicit plotting of historical
developments as the tragic decline and fall of the ancient city from the
glorious days of classical Athens. Seldom is the underlying plot line or
meta-narrative as explicit as when Kathleen Freeman states that the his-
tory of Greece “reads like a tragedy in three acts”: the glorious emergence
of city states like Athens; the intellectual and political achievements of sci-
ence and philosophy in the fifth and early fourth centuries; and the unfor-
tunate “break-up of the city-state system” in the later fourth century which
brought with it the end of the distinctive thought and work of ancient Hel-
las (Freeman 1950, xv–xx).
Quite often, it seems to be an idealization of classical Athens—a reflec-
tion of scholars’ value judgments—that serves as the archetype against
which the inferiority of cities in Hellenistic and Roman times is estab-
lished. Rarely are the value judgments that accompany the idealization of
the classical polis as blatant as when Ernest Barker laments that “those
who have been touched by the tradition, and educated by the philosophy,
of the Greek city-state may be permitted to stand by its grave and remem-
ber its life; to wonder what, under happier auspices, it might have achieved”
(1927, 535). In a critique of Ste. Croix’s affirmation of the popularity of the
Athenian empire, Donald W. Bradeen perceptively notes: “most of us ancient
historians have a sympathy for Athens and her Empire; no matter how
impartial we try to be, our whole training as classicists, and possibly our
political bent as well, incline us that way” (1975, 405).
Classical Athens itself, however, may not have lived up to the scholarly
ideal. Arlene W. Saxonhouse’s recent study suggests that scholars “still
bring to the study of ancient democracy our conceptions of democracy as
it has emerged in the nineteenth and…twentieth centuries,” often allow-
ing modern values to shape a romantic view of Athenian democracy (1996,
7, 1–29). We must also be cautious about assuming that classical Athens was
typical, since it is the only polis of that era for which substantial evidence
survives; as P.J. Rhodes points out, a variety of different constitutions were
adopted by other cities in the classical era, some of which included vary-
ing combinations of democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy (1994, 579; cf.
Pecirka 1976, 6–7).
Even if democratic Athens was, in some respects, typical of the earlier
forms of the polis, and even if the decline-scholars are justified in the degree
to which they emphasize the loss of autonomy and democracy in subsequent
years, such historical developments do not demonstrate the precipitous
decline in civic life and identity scholars usually presume. Changes in one
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specific area, such as political participation, do not always equal degener-
ation in all others. A trend toward oligarchy, for example, does not mean
that the lower social strata (which play less of a role in official political
life) will necessarily feel dislocated and isolated from the social and religious
facets of the polis, or lack a sense of identity in relation to civic structures.
Moreover, recent years have seen the beginning of a shift away from the
overall paradigm of decline, although the wake of such a shift has not yet
reached disciplines such as our own. The shift is evident, for example, in a
comparison of the first and second editions of The Cambridge Ancient History.
Whereas a contributor to the 1927 edition concluded his discussion of pol-
itics in the fourth century BCE with a section entitled, “The end of the polis,”
P.J. Rhodes’s corresponding article in the 1994 edition concludes with a
conspicuously interrogative section entitled, “The failure of the polis?” Louis
Robert, whose knowledge of the inscriptions of Asia Minor remains unpar-
alleled, states: “la cité grecque n’est pas morte à Chéronée, ni sous Alexan-
dre, ni dans le cours de toute l’époque hellénistique” (1969, 42). Robert
goes on to say that although cities such as Athens and Sparta no longer pos-
sessed their former power in international affairs, the internal structures of
civic life in most cities remained largely unchanged: “La vie de la cité con-
tinue dans le même cadre et avec les même idéaux” (1969, 42). What was
relatively new, however, was the emerging system of benefaction (see below,
Models of Decline in the Study of Social-Religious Life).
P.J. Rhodes (1994), Walter Eder (1995), Mogens Herman Hansen (1993,
1994, 1995), Erich Gruen (1993), and others question many of the key
interpretations of previous scholars concerning the early crisis and decline
of the polis, emphasizing instead the vitality of civic life in the Hellenistic
and Roman eras, despite changes and developments (see, e.g., Gauthier
1985, 1993). Stephen Mitchell argues that, despite the loss of complete
autonomy for cities in Asia Minor, there was still considerable continuity
from earlier times: the cities continued as effective centres of administra-
tion and, perhaps more importantly, the cities were, in a very positive sense,
communities (1993, 1:199).
These and other recent studies call into question many scholars’ spe-
cific historical interpretations concerning both autonomy and democracy,
which are in need of considerable qualification or, in some cases, rejection.
Most scholars who speak of decline hold in common a definition of the polis,
which emphasizes autonomy (autonomia) or sovereignty as its essential
ingredient; hence, dependence on an outside power such as a king or
emperor means loss of identity as a genuine polis, and subsequent decline.
This definition of the polis, however, is largely a product of modern schol-
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arship, as Hansen’s recent studies convincingly show. No ancient discus-
sion of the nature of the polis mentions autonomy as a defining character-
istic; furthermore, hypêkoos (“dependent”) is the opposite of autonomos, yet
the term hypêkoos polis is well attested, which would be a nonsensical state-
ment if ancients considered autonomy an essential ingredient (Hansen
1993, 18–20; 1994, 15–17; 1995). Moreover, Hansen states, every “city-state
would of course have preferred to be autonomous, but obviously a city-
state did not lose its identity as a polis by being subjected to another city-
state or, for example, to the king of Persia, or Macedon, or a Hellenistic
ruler, or Rome” (1993, 19; cf. Brunt 1990, 272).
Furthermore, many scholars have overstated the degree to which the
Hellenistic kings and Roman authorities actively interfered in the affairs of
the cities. Recent studies of the nature of Roman rule by scholars such as
Fergus Millar (1967, 1977, 1984) and G. P. Burton (1975) point to its pas-
sive and reactive character. G.P. Burton (1993, 24–25) points to some of
the “severe constraints” and practical limitations on the effective power of
proconsuls and other Roman officials: the province of Asia, for example,
included about 300–500 civic communities, under the direction of only the
proconsul, three legates and a quaestor. Keith Hopkins (1980, 121) estimates
that, in the middle of the second century, there was one elite official (of sen-
atorial or equestrian rank) for every 350,000–400,000 subjects. Seldom did
Roman emperors or authorities actively interfere in civic affairs, unless
public disorders could not be handled locally or action was requested from
below. As Peter Anthony Brunt states: “it was not the practice of the Romans
to govern much. The governor had only a small staff, and he did little more
than defend his province, ensure the collection of the taxes and decide the
most important criminal and civil cases. The local communities were left
in the main to run their own affairs” (1990, 116–17).
Such a picture of Roman rule contradicts, for example, David Magie’s
argument that the self-government of the cities in Asia Minor was fundamen-
tally undermined by active interference through a requirement for the gov-
ernor’s approval in connection with civic decrees (1950, 1:641, 2:1504n. 21).
As James H. Oliver (1954) convincingly argues, the inscriptional evidence
which Magie interprets as support for this view in fact represents quite a dif-
ferent situation: cities were not regularly required to gain permission from
Roman authorities for their enactments, but rather sought occasional sup-
port from Roman governors, who were otherwise hesitant to get involved.
It is against this background that the passages in Plutarch’s Political Pre-
cepts ought to be understood: with Plutarch not so much protesting the
active interference of Roman authorities as exhorting Menemachos to avoid
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the practice of other civic officials who actively and unnecessarily seek
their governor’s involvement, thereby forcing “the governors to be their
masters more than the governors wish” (814e-815a; translation by Oliver
1954, 163). Certainly there are other passages, in which Plutarch laments
the loss of total freedom by the polis, for instance, when he cautions Men-
emachos to beware of the “boots of Roman soldiers just above your head”
(813e). But, shortly thereafter, he advises Menemachos to foster friend-
ships with Roman officials in order to further the welfare of the polis (814d).
Plutarch evidently believed that the continued success of Roman rule was
a consequence of divine providence; to struggle against it was to challenge
the will of the gods. To categorize him as either anti- or pro-Roman, as
Simon Swain points out, is to oversimplify a far more complex picture
(1996, 135–86).
The second main point cited in support of a theory of decline, which
is in need of qualification, is the degree to which the typical polis of the Hel-
lenistic and Roman periods represents the degeneration of an earlier form
of democracy. I have already noted that many scholars uphold an ideal
vision of Athenian democracy, which is shaped by modern values and does
not accurately reflect the reality of the ancient situation. For example, it is
quite common for scholars to stress the increasing importance of the
wealthy in political life, and the emerging dominance of oligarchy in the Hel-
lenistic and Roman eras. Already in classical Athens, however, the wealthy,
rather than average citizens, seem to have been dominant in the important
political positions (Rhodes 1994, 566, 573; cf. A.H.M. Jones 1940, 166–69).
Scholars such as Hansen (cf. Ste. Croix 1981, 284) also question the degree
to which we can speak of ancient democracy in terms of the majority vote
of all citizens when, in fact, the evidence concerning the number of citizens
who could actually attend meetings of the assembly in classical Athens
suggests otherwise (e.g., the seating capacity of the Pnyx accommodated
only one-third to one-quarter of the citizen population in the fourth cen-
tury BCE; see Saxonhouse 1996, 5–6).
Even so, as Rhodes states in reference to Ste. Croix’s theories, “the
failure of democracy would not be the same thing as the failure of the polis,
and it is not obvious that either occurred” (Rhodes 1994, 189n.102). There
is evidence that the assembly of the people could continue to play a signif-
icant role, in the Hellenistic and Roman eras, despite the prominence of the
wealthy in civic affairs. Gruen points to the surviving attendance records
for the Hellenistic era in various cities of Asia Minor and states that, con-
trary to the clichés in scholarship, “popular participation in the Hellenis-
tic city-states did not consist merely in empty slogans, but rather involved
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the participation of citizens in the various legislative and judicial activi-
ties alongside honorary ones” (1993, 354). Furthermore, scholars such as
Stephen Mitchell and Guy MacLean Rogers have begun to question the
common view that, in the Roman era, the council so completely usurped
the role of the people that the latter possessed very little, if any, real power,
but merely approved lists of candidates for office.1
These various new studies mount a fundamental challenge to key inter-
pretations of historical developments that have served as the basis of the
theory of decline, which itself rests on questionable value judgments, mod-
els, and assumptions. Although important changes and developments def-
initely did take place under Hellenistic and Roman rule, these changes are
not best understood in terms of a broad notion of decline. Further positive
evidence for the continued vitality of the polis will be presented shortly.
But first, the implications of the theory of decline for the study of social, cul-
tural, and religious facets of civic life needs more attention, especially in light
of our focus on religious rivalries.
MODELS OF DECLINE IN THE STUDY OF SOCIAL-RELIGIOUS LIFE
Unfortunately, the model of civic decline has often been used to explain
other social and cultural phenomena in the Hellenistic and Roman eras.
Many scholars correlate this decline with a degeneration of traditional reli-
gious life. As S.R.F. Price notes, “the conventional model, which has been
applied to both Greek and Roman cults, posits an early apogee followed by
a long and continuous decline, until the last embers were extinguished by
Christianity” (1984, 14). As we shall see, the application to these other
social and religious developments of both the model of civic decline and its
related assumptions can produce misleading and exaggerated conclusions.
One can also discern the role of modern value judgments in such scenar-
ios; parallel to some scholars’ use of classical Athens as a foil against which
all subsequent developments are evaluated in negative terms, an ideal view
of Christianity serves as a measure of genuine religion, over against which
most, but not all, preceding phenomena are evaluated as superficial, less
than genuine, and therefore in decay.
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W.S. Ferguson’s outline (1928) in The Cambridge Ancient History of the
leading ideas of the Hellenistic Age reflects widespread views evident in the
works of such influential scholars of Greco-Roman religion as Martin P.
Nilsson (1961; 1964), André-Jean Festugière (1954; 1972), Eric Robertson
Dodds (1959, 179–206, 236–69), and those who depend on them, such as
Peter Green (1990, 382–413, 586–601).2 According to these scholars, the
vitality of traditional Greek religion was bound to the effectiveness of the
autonomous and democratic polis in such a way that the decline of the polis,
between the fourth and third centuries BCE, brought about the downfall of
the civic religious system, leaving an “empty shell” having little vestige of
“genuine religion,” so that, in Nilsson’s words, “the ancient gods were tot-
tering” (1964, 260–62, 274–75, 285; cf. Murray 1935, 106–108, 158–63).
More recently, Luther H. Martin claims to discern a parallel between the
modern condition and that of the Hellenistic age: “Both are shaped in peri-
ods of transformation characterized by…altered sociopolitical systems…[by]
the influx of strange new gods from the East. For both, the traditional gods
might well be termed dead” (1987, 3). It seems, however, that this is less
recognition of actual similarities between the ancient situation and the
modern one than it is an imposition of modern concepts and historical
developments on the description of the ancient world.
Even if individuals continued to participate in traditional religious cer-
emonies, it is assumed that their feelings and attitudes were no longer
involved. Some scholars appear to possess additional knowledge, beyond
what the evidence of continued participation in traditional forms of religion
suggests. Festugière, for example, asserts that the decline of civic religions
is an “undeniable fact.” What it comes down to is that this “undeniable fact”
is based on Festugière’s claim to be able to distinguish between the “outer
form” of the cults, which, he admits, continued to function largely
unchanged, according to the only evidence we have, and the “feelings”
and “attitudes” of those who participated, which, Festugière asserts, were
no longer attached to the civic cults and, correspondingly, to the polis (1954,
37–38; cf. Dodds 1959, 243–44; Carcopino 1941, 137–44; P. Green 1990,
587). Nilsson similarly discounts the evidence for the continued vitality of
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civic religion by categorizing it as a sign not of continued vitality but of an
historical interest from a romantic and sentimental background charac-
teristic of an age “weary of its culture” (1964, 295).
The decline of civic structures also led to other important trends, includ-
ing the rise of individualism, which was “the dominant feature of the age”
(W.S. Ferguson 1928, 4; cf. Nilsson 1964, 282–83, 287; Farnell 1912, 137,
140–41, 147–50, who speaks of the rise of a spirit of individualism and a cor-
responding waning in the old religion; Guthrie 1950, 256, 334). Tarn and
Griffith state: “Man as a political animal, a fraction of the polis or self-gov-
erning city state, had ended with Aristotle; with Alexander begins man as
an individual” (1952, 79). Luther H. Martin seems to have had a change of
mind on the issue of individualism (contrast 1987 and 1994). Moreover, indi-
viduals in the Hellenistic era suffered from a general malaise character-
ized by feelings of detachment, isolation, and uncertainty: “loneliness and
helplessness in a vast disintegrating world” (W.S. Ferguson 1928, 35),
which led them to seek substitutes for the attachment they had previously
felt toward the polis and its social and religious structures. Scholars who hold
these views often explain and group together various religious phenomena
in the Hellenistic world, including the addiction to foreign cults or mystery
religions, the supposed preoccupation with Tyche, the popularity of both
magic and astrology, and the rise of ruler cults, as (often misguided)
responses to a social and spiritual vacuum, as relatively new compensatory
phenomena.3
It is worth pointing out the place of ruler cults in this overall scenario,
since it reveals some of the underlying assumptions and value judgments
involved. For Nilsson and others, ruler cults were the epitome of faltering
religious life, and foreshadowed the fall that was yet to come: “The origin
of the cult of men in Greece is to be sought in the convulsions of the dying
religion” (Nilsson 1964, 288, italics mine; cf. W.S. Ferguson 1928, 13–22).
Nilsson’s opinion is the same in his very influential Geschichte der griechis-
chen Religion, where he states: “dass der Herrscherkult eine Verfallserschei-
nung der griechischen Religion ist, der es an wirklich religiösem Gehalt
mangelt” (1961, 182). Lily Ross Taylor gives a similar assessment of the
imperial cult when she states that “the inclusion of a mortal among the gods
would not bring to the men of the day the same shock that it would have
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caused in a time when the native religion was strong” (1931, 54). Accord-
ing to Dodds, such cults were “expressions of helpless dependence; he who
treats another human being as divine thereby assigns to himself the rela-
tive status of a child or an animal” (1959, 242).
Through such cults, rulers became a somewhat superficial replacement
for the “old gods,” whose importance was waning. Nilsson’s strictly nega-
tive evaluation of ruler cults, within his overall story of a “dying religion”
(which is paralleled in the works of other scholars, e.g., P. Green 1990,
396–413), evinces the convergence of the two modernizing concerns—the
one regarding superior political life (i.e., the idealized picture of classical
Athens) and the other regarding genuine religion (i.e., the idealized picture
of Christianity)—which together serve as the basis for evaluating whether
something is degeneration, rather than simply change or development. On
the one hand, ruler cults involved the inhabitants of the polis in the worship
of the same outside, interfering power that was already undermining their
freedom and democracy. On the other hand, they also embodied a strictly
outward, state-supported, and artificial form of religion, far removed from
the personal religion that otherwise might have evoked the genuine feeling
of individual participation. Nilsson and other scholars have similar things
to say regarding imperial cults in the Roman era, which ostensibly had very
little meaning for those who were involved and “lacked all genuine religious
content” (Nilsson 1948, 178; cf. 1961, 385; for discussion and criticism of such
oversimplifications, see Pleket 1965; Price 1984; Harland 1996, 2000). Once
again, value judgments, informed by modern concerns rather than the
weight of the evidence, play a significant role in the development of this
overall scenario of a tragic decline, with a touch of romance being added to
the plot through reference to the forthcoming triumph of Christianity. In
chapter 1 of this book, Vaage gives examples of how similar assumptions by
historians have shaped perceptions of early Christianity and its competitors.
According to the common view, one of the most important responses
to feelings of deracination was the rise of what scholars such as Nilsson and
Festugière call private or personal religion. This was, supposedly, a replace-
ment for the outward and in many ways artificial public or civic religion,
which no longer evoked the feeling of the individuals who participated.
As traditional civic religious structures declined, private clubs, mysteries,
and associations (which often involved not only the individual’s personal
choice, but also some notion of salvation) were the most successful social-
religious units (Festugière 1954, 40; Dodds 1959, 243). This was because they
responded to feelings of helplessness, isolation, and uncertainty by pro-
viding a replacement for the sense of belonging and attachment that indi-
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viduals previously had felt toward the civic community and its social struc-
tures, including the household. In the case of the mysteries, they offered
a religious system of salvation from uncertain conditions; in this sense,
they were similar to Christianity.
Many scholars who hold similar views would stop short of explicitly
stating, as George Herbert Box does, what seems to underlie such evalua-
tions concerning the notion of a preparation for the triumph of Christian-
ity: “[The mysteries] and the religious brotherhoods which made purity of
life a condition of membership are genuine manifestations of the religious
spirit, and may be regarded as a real preparation for Christianity” (1929, 45).
Many scholars who suggest that the mysteries approached the status of a
genuine religion (i.e., Christianity) are also careful to assert Christianity’s
difference from contemporary mysteries. The mysteries serve a twofold
function in such theories: establishing preparation for, and serving as a
foil against which, the superiority and uniqueness of Christianity is estab-
lished (cf. Gasparro 1985, xiii-xxiii; J.Z. Smith 1990).
In the preceding scenario, associations are viewed as a compensatory
phenomenon or symptom of decline, which accordingly should be defined
in contrast with social structures of the polis, sometimes in subversive
terms; according to John Kenyon Davies, for example, these groups “ran
counter to city-based religion and society” (1984, 318). This view of asso-
ciations as a compensation for the decline of the polis is widespread in
scholarship (see, e.g., Ziebarth 1896, 191–93; Poland 1909, 516; Tod 1932,
71–73; Guthrie 1950, 265–68; Dill 1956, 256; Herrmann, Waszink and Köt-
ting 1978, 94; J.Z. Smith 1978, 187).
Only a few of the general problems with the notion of religious decline
can be mentioned here. The most fundamental problem is the evidence to
the contrary. Some recent, as well as older, studies of civic religious life,
namely, those that do not begin with an a priori model of decline, have con-
vincingly interpreted the evidence quite differently. Moreover, as Johannes
Geffcken saw in 1920 (1978), and both Ramsay MacMullen (1981) and
Robin Lane Fox (1986) have vividly demonstrated more recently, the weight
of the evidence demonstrates that Greco-Roman religion, traditional and
otherwise, far from showing signs of deathly illness already in the third cen-
tury BCE, thrived at least into the third century CE, even though there were
certainly changes, developments, and differences from one region to
another. MacMullen points out the quality of our evidence: “Religion, like
many another aspect of life, rises and falls on the quantity of surviving
evidence like a boat on the tide. Highs and lows of attestation, if they only
follow the line on the table, indicate no change at all” (1981, 127).
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Second, theories regarding widespread social-religious decline share the
problems of the parallel notion of the decline of the polis (which is assumed
rather than substantiated), including, for example, the tendency to neglect
the possibility that innovations are not always negative, nor signs of degen-
eration, but simply changes (North 1976, 10–12).
Third, it seems that some scholars impose on the ancient evidence
concepts and models of historical development (cultural and intellectual)
borrowed from the modern era, which are not appropriate for the study of
the Greco-Roman world. For example, such scholars claim to find in the Hel-
lenistic Age the rise of individualism and corresponding feelings of detach-
ment and uncertainty. The tendency to look for parallels, in the ancient
world, to modern developments is perhaps most obvious in Dodds’s The
Greeks and the Irrational (1959): besides his emphasis on the rise of individ-
ualism, he sees in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE the Greek “Enlighten-
ment” and “the rise of rationalism,” to which many later developments in
the Hellenistic era are viewed as an irrational response (for a critique of
Dodds’s views, see Gordon 1972b; also Paul Veyne 1990, 41).
A developed concept of individualism, however, and the related con-
cepts of private versus public did not emerge until the sixteenth century, and
developed fully only with the European Enlightenment; such concepts are,
accordingly, inappropriate for studying pre-modern societies. The devel-
opments that W.S. Ferguson, Festugière, Dodds, and others claim to find
in the ancient world, and emphasize the most, are precisely those that
came with the European Enlightenment and modern individualism: the
individual’s detachment from the larger community, freedom of choice,
cultural mobility, critique of traditional forms of religion, and affinity for
privatized, mystical religion. Take, for example, the imposition of many
such details on the ancient world in the article about “Individualism” by
Lawrence Hazelrigg in the Encyclopedia of Sociology (1992), and compare this
description with what scholars such as Festugière like to find in the Greco-
Roman world.
Hazelrigg rightly emphasizes the contrast between pre-modern soci-
eties, in which social relations are largely organic, corporate, and group-
based, and the individualism of the modern era. Furthermore, as Peter
Brown observes: “many modern accounts of religious evolution of the
Roman world place great emphasis on the malaise of life in great cities in
Hellenistic and Roman times. Yet the loneliness of the great city and the
rapid deculturation of immigrants from traditionalist areas are modern
ills: they should not be overworked as explanatory devices for the society
we are studying. We can be far from certain that [as Dodds states] ‘such
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loneliness must have been felt by millions’” (1978, 2–3). Consider also
Jonathan Barnes’s comment: “life in Hellenistic Greece was no more upset-
ting, no more at the mercy of fickle fortune or malign foes, than it had
been in an earlier era” (1986, 365).
Festugière’s tendency to see in the ancient context parallels to the
modern is evident in his statement: “la civilisation gréco-romaine est déjà
une civilisation de grandes villes. Dans ces grandes villes la majorité des
habitants vivent comme aujourd-hui” (cited in P. Brown 1978, 3; cf. P. Green
1990, 404). La Piana’s study of immigrant groups in Rome likewise tends
to see parallels between the situation of immigrants in the ancient and
modern context; he alludes to a universal experience, which he imagines
that all immigrants in all times, at least to some degree, shared (1927,
201–205, 225–26). In their enthusiasm to find important connections or sim-
ilarities between the ancient Greco-Roman world and our own, such his-
torians sometimes implicitly impose (rather than discover) structural and
developmental parallels between the modern and ancient situations. This
tendency is perhaps related to the fact that the Greco-Roman world is con-
sidered formative for the development of Western culture, and is thus
closely connected with the values and sentiments of such historians. This
factor is especially evident in Luther H. Martin’s introduction to Hellenis-
tic religions (1987, 3).
Another problematic aspect of this overall scenario of decline in reli-
gious life is that an anachronistic approach sometimes plays a role, mod-
ernizing and Christianizing the conception of religion. Because the civic cults
of paganism eventually “lost” to the adopted religion of empire (=Chris-
tianity), such cults must have been inadequate in addressing people’s
needs, and accordingly began their inevitable decline long before. Any reli-
gious activity during this age of decline, which can be construed as private,
personal, individualistic religion, involving genuine feelings or notions of
salvation, i.e., any religious activity approximating what such scholars
understand Christianity to have been (according to a modern Jamesian
definition of genuine religion), is viewed as more vital than, or superior to,
other traditional forms of religious life, though still inferior to Christian-
ity, which was in other ways unique.
What seems to underlie, for example, Festugière’s notion of personal
or genuine religion closely resembles William James’s definition of reli-
gion as “the feelings, acts and experiences of individual men in their soli-
tude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever
they may consider the divine” (1902, 50; cf. Festugière 1954, 1–4; Dodds
1959, 243; 1965, 2; Nilsson 1961, 711–12; P. Green 1990, 588). Festugière is
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not alone in adopting such a limited definition of religion; it is not hard to
see how the application to the ancient world (or to any non-western cul-
ture, for that matter) of such a modern, western, Christian, individualist
conception of religion can obscure the vast majority of religious life, cate-
gorizing it (a priori) as artificial and less than genuine.
Hence the misguided and all-consuming focus, in some scholarship, on
the mystery religions. Giulia Sfameni Gasparro (1985, xiii–xxiii) and Wal-
ter Burkert (1987), among others, question the Christianizing interpreta-
tions of the mysteries that were previously prevalent. As Burkert points
out, mysteries were an optional activity within the broader context of tra-
ditional religious forms, not a separate movement or religion over against
the polis and its structures. Associations and groups that engaged in mys-
teries were often fully integrated into the complex structures of family and
polis (Burkert 1987, 32) rather than being their replacements.
EVIDENCE FOR THE VITALITY OF THE POLIS IN ASIA MINOR
Now that we have challenged some scholarly portraits of the polis, we can
go on to discuss more positive evidence concerning the continuing vitality
of civic life. I begin by addressing the significance, for the polis, of social net-
works of benefaction in the Hellenistic and Roman eras; then, I continue
by using inscriptional evidence for associations in Roman Asia as an indi-
cation of involvements in, attachments to, and identifications with numer-
ous dimensions of the polis on the part of its inhabitants from various social
strata.
Social Networks of Benefaction
One can see important continuities within many of the central political,
social, and cultural institutions and structures of the polis, from the classi-
cal period into the Hellenistic and Roman eras. The constitutions of cities
that were founded on the model of the Greek polis continued to consist of
the two main bodies of civic authority: the council (boulê), which usually
numbered between two hundred and five hundred members; and the peo-
ple (dêmos), which included the citizen body divided according to tribes
(phylai), along with various civic official positions and boards (whose titles
could differ from one city to the next). Social-cultural institutions, includ-
ing some mentioned earlier by Pausanias, remained prominent in civic life.
Yet one of the most significant developments in the structure of the polis in
the late-Hellenistic and Roman eras, which is also essential for under-
standing competition, rivalry, and co-operation between different groups,
was the emergence of a systematic pattern of benefaction (euergetism),
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which relied upon social network connections and was accompanied by a
particular cultural world view.
By the time the regions of western Asia Minor were incorporated into
the Roman province of Asia (ca. 133 BCE), this system of benefaction—an
elaboration and systematization of conventions that characterized the
Greek polis in earlier times—had become a prominent structural element
with special relevance to the social system and economic well-being of the
cities. Space does not permit a discussion of the origins of this system of
benefaction or euergetism (see Veyne 1990; 1987, 95–115; Gauthier 1985;
1993; cf. Wallace-Hadrill 1990, 150–54; Mitchell 1993, 1:210; Sartre 1991,
147–66). Basically, Veyne differs from Gauthier in emphasizing a sharp
caesura between the classical/democratic and the Hellenistic/non-democratic
period, in connection with the emergence of euergetism as a system in
Hellenistic times. Gauthier, on the other hand (correctly, I believe), puts
emphasis on the continuing importance of democracy, and suggests that
euergetism flows naturally from the competitive ethos of democracy; he sees
the era of full-fledged euergetism from the second century BCE onward.
Wallace-Hadrill discusses ways in which “the Romans absorbed the Greek
honorific idiom gradually, almost without realising it” (1990, 166).
This system involved webs of reciprocal relations within social net-
works marked by a clearly differentiated hierarchy, though the potential for
relations was quite fluid at all levels. The most prominent characteristic of
these reciprocal relations within social networks was the exchange of ben-
efits or gifts of numerous kinds (e.g., protection, financial contributions for
various purposes) in return for appropriate honours. The system was recip-
rocal, in the sense that both the benefactor and the beneficiary (whether
gods, individuals, groups, or institutions) stood to gain from the exchange,
whether the benefit was tangible or otherwise. The system was also self-
perpetuating, in that a benefaction was followed by fitting honours, which
in turn ensured the probability of further benefactions from the same
source in the future, as well as benefactions from others who might seek
to outdo their competitors in the pursuit of honour.
The appropriateness of the honours depended on both the nature of the
benefits conferred and the position of the benefactor and the beneficiary
within the overall hierarchy of relations. Failure fittingly to honour a bene-
factor resulted in shame (aischynê); as Dio of Prusa suggests, this was akin
to impiety (asebeia) toward the gods (Or. 31.57, 65, 80–81, 157). Correspond-
ingly, failure of the wealthy to provide such benefactions appropriately was
a threat to the position they strove to maintain within society: in this sense,
benefaction became an obligation, not simply a voluntary action. The pro-
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vision of benefactions and the granting of honours reaffirmed the relative
positions of both the benefactor and the beneficiary within the social sys-
tem of the polis and cosmos.
At the top of this hierarchy, as powers external to the polis, were both
the gods and the rulers, whose ongoing protection and benefaction ensured
the well-being of the polis and its constituent groups. The deities’ protec-
tion of the polis and its inhabitants, holding off earthquakes, famine, and
other natural disasters, while providing safety (sôtêria), stability, and peace,
was deserving of the utmost honours, especially cultic. Dio Chrysostom, for
example, describes the role of the gods in causing (or preventing) such
natural disasters (Or. 38.20). A deadly plague in various cities of Asia in the
mid-second century CE led the city of Hierapolis to consult Apollo at Klaros,
whose oracular response advised that sacrifices be made to several gods in
order to appease their wrathful displeasures (Parke 1985:153–54). When nat-
ural disasters occurred, it was assumed that the gods had not been fit-
tingly honoured; Jews or Christians accordingly became more likely to face
local harassment and sporadic persecution (cf. Tertullian, Apol. 40.1–2). By
the Roman era, the rulers’ relation to the polis was considered to be paral-
lel to that of the gods, and rulers whose beneficence and provision of sta-
bility were comparable to those of the gods were thought to be equally
deserving of cultic honours. Examples of this parallelism between the roles
of the gods and of the rulers can be drawn from various upper-class authors
from Asia Minor, for instance, Artemidoros, who says: “rulers, like gods, also
have the power to treat people well or badly” (Onir. 3.13).
Scholars who think that cultic honours given to rulers epitomize the
failure of the polis and represent the utter debasement of its ideals and
values fundamentally misunderstand the meaning and function of such
honorary activities (cf. Price 1984; Friesen 1993; Harland 1996). Instead,
the incorporation of emperors within the existing framework of the polis
actually served to reinforce the ideals, values, and structures of civic soci-
ety, rather than to undermine them (cf. Price 1984; R.R.R. Smith 1987;
Wallace-Hadrill 1990, 152–53). What this incorporation of the emperors also
means, as Fergus Millar (1993) stresses, is that having a relationship with
the distant emperor was very much a part of what the polis was in Roman
times.
The gods and emperors may have been at the top of the social net-
works upon which the system of benefaction rested, but they were cer-
tainly not the only important players. Imperial officials in the provinces also
held sufficiently high positions within this hierarchy that local elites and
groups were sure to cultivate contacts with these powerful figures. Per-
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haps more importantly for the everyday life of the average polis, the wealthy
elites and other inhabitants or groups in the cities were expected to provide
various services and benefactions for the well-being of the polis and its
inhabitants. Such contributions could take the form of official liturgies or
magistracies, both of which required considerable financial outlay (which
led to a blurring between the two). But, apart from these official roles,
inhabitants could also make benefactions to the polis or its constituent
groups in the form of financial contributions for the establishment of build-
ings, festivals, statues, and other structures that were dedicated to honour
civic institutions, gods, or emperors. Benefactions could also take the form
of banquets or food distributions in times of famine, such as the provi-
sions made for the inhabitants at Termessos in Pamphylia by a wealthy
woman named Atalante (TAM III 4, 62). The beneficiaries of such actions
were expected to reciprocate with appropriate honours, such as the erec-
tion of an inscription of gratitude or a statue, in honour of the benefactor.
Gratitude for the benefaction of a festival could be shown in less tangible
ways; a statement by Petronius well sums up this mentality: “He gave me
a spectacle, but I applauded it. We’re even: one hand washes the other”
(cited in Veyne 1987, 113).
This leads to the question of what motivated such contributions to the
life of the polis, thereby ensuring the stability of this systematic pattern of
benefactions. Motivations naturally differed from one person and situa-
tion to the next, but three main components tend to stand out. First, the
role of genuine feelings of civic pride should not be discounted. Second, hon-
our (timê) was highly valued in and of itself, and its pursuit (philotimia) was
among the most highly praised virtues. The desire to have one’s benefac-
tions or deeds remembered after death, in order to preserve one’s reputa-
tion for posterity, was accordingly significant (cf. Dio, Or. 31.16; Polybius
20.6.5–6; Laum 1964 [passim]; Woolf 1996, 25–27).
A third motivating factor, however, must not be forgotten: the wealthy
elites’ fear of what might happen if conspicuous donations were not made.
There was a set of values and expectations which made such benefactions
virtually a duty; failure to meet these expectations, especially at critical
times, could result in angry mobs seeking revenge against the wealthy, as
happened during a food shortage in Prusa, when an angry mob came after
Dio and his neighbour (Or. 46, 7.25–26; cf. Philostratos, Vit. Apoll. 1.15).
Contributions by the wealthy on a regular basis ensured the maintenance
of their position and prestige within the city, while also limiting the poten-
tial for social conflicts when the contrasts between rich and poor, ruler and
ruled, were particularly stark (Mitchell 1993, 1:206).
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It is not hard to see how competition and rivalry, as well as co-opera-
tion, played important roles within ancient social systems. Competition
for pre-eminence among wealthy elites was matched by competition among
the potential recipients of such benefactions. The constituent groups of
the polis were in many ways competitors with one another in their attempts
to maintain contacts with and receive ongoing support from important
persons within social networks. Beneficiaries also had something to gain
from publicly advertising, through the medium of honorary inscriptions,
their connections: namely, the advantage that such connections accrued,
in their competition for prestige within the civic context. In setting up an
honorary inscription, for example, an association or guild was not only
honouring its benefactor but also making a claim regarding its own place
within society, reaffirming in a very concrete way its ties within the net-
works of the polis (cf. Woolf 1996, 29; Harland 1999).
Yet co-operation was also essential to the system. Individual inhabitants
of the lower social strata—such as a purple-dyer alone, for instance—were
not very likely to gain the attention and benefaction of a wealthy imperial
or civic official. But by co-operating together in the form of an association,
united purple-dyers could ensure the possibility of such relations within the
social networks of the polis and empire. On a broader scale, too, apart from
its own intramural competitions, the sense of civic pride and identity,
belonging to the polis as such, meant that its inhabitants as a whole co-oper-
ated together in broader-scale competitions and rivalries with other cities
(cf. Dio, Or. 38–39).
Associations and the Civic Framework
Now that we have a framework within which to discuss the polis in Roman
times, we can provide some concrete examples of the working of this sys-
tem of benefaction and the nature of social relations within it. I have cho-
sen to use as a starting point for this discussion the epigraphic evidence for
small social-religious groups or associations in Roman Asia (for abbrevia-
tions for primary sources in this section, see G.H.R. Horsley and Lee 1994),
not only because it happens to be the area with which I am most familiar
(cf. Harland 1996, 1999, 2000), but for two other reasons as well. First,
associations play a key role in common scholarly scenarios of civic and reli-
gious decline; second, many of these groups represent the lower strata of
society which many scholars of the decline-theories think were the far-
thest removed from civic identity and participation. Therefore, if an inves-
tigation of the actual evidence for these groups shows signs of continuing
attachments to the civic community and its institutions and structures,
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along with a sense of belonging among their members, then the theories
of decline are questionable from another angle.
Strong feelings of civic pride and identification with the polis or home-
land (patris) are clearly evident not only among wealthy benefactors or
elite authors, such as Aristides of Smyrna, Dio of Prusa, Artemidoros of
Daldis, and Strabo of Amaseia, but also among various other segments of
society, including those represented within occupational and other associ-
ations. Regarding the first group, Aelius Aristides delivered an epideictic
speech in praise of his homeland, Smyrna, speaking of the polis as “the
very model of a city,” which “recommends a love of itself among all
mankind” (Or. 17.8). When an earthquake heavily damaged Smyrna, Aris-
tides mourned over this catastrophe that had struck the most beautiful
city, “the eye of Asia”; his letter to Marcus Aurelius requesting support for
rebuilding was a success (Or. 18, 19, 20). Dio’s epideictic speech in response
to the honours that his homeland of Prusa granted him is full of refer-
ences to his pride and attachment in relation to the polis (Or. 44). Artemi-
doros dedicates Book Three of his dream interpretations to Daldis, “his
native land…in gratitude for my upbringing” (Onir. 3.66). Strabo is sure to
specify that Amaseia is his city and homeland (patris), and his description
is wholly positive (Geogr. 12.3.15.39).
Individuals or groups could express their sense of belonging to the
polis or homeland through their involvement in benefactions for (or dedi-
cations to) the polis and its institutions, either as benefactors or as benefi-
ciaries. The association of fishermen and fishmongers at Ephesus, for
example, representing a spectrum of social-economic levels, built and ded-
icated the fishery toll-office to the imperial family of Nero, the people
(dêmos) of the Romans, and the people of the Ephesians (IEph 20; mid-
first century CE; cf. IEph 1501; G.H.R. Horsley 1989). The guild of silversmiths
and goldsmiths at Smyrna expressed both its piety toward the goddess
Athena and the civic pride of its members by repairing her statue “for the
homeland” (ISmyrna 721; ca. 14–37 CE). The dyers at Hierapolis (Lykos val-
ley) who set up a statue of personified Council (Boulê) evidently identified
with the institutions of their polis (SEG 41, 1201; ca. 100–150 CE). Several
civic officials and some groups at Smyrna, including theologians (theologoi),
an association of hymn-singers (hymnodoi), and, likely, an immigrant group
of Judeans (hoi pote Ioudaioi), displayed civic-mindedness by joining together
to provide financial contributions toward a project of the polis in the early
second century (ISmyrna 697; ca. 124 CE).
Civic inhabitants might also express their identification with the polis
by honouring an individual who acted as a benefactor and showed good-
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will toward the homeland. Examples of occupational and religious associ-
ations participating in this aspect of the civic networks of benefaction could
be cited for many cities in Asia.4 An inscription from Smyrna, for example,
involves the sacred synodos of performers (technitai) and initiates (mystai)
gathered round Dionysos Breseus, who are honouring Marcus Aurelius
Julianus, a civic official and benefactor, “because of his piety towards the
god and his goodwill towards the polis” (ISmyrna 639; mid-late second cen-
tury CE).
What is perhaps even more telling, concerning the involvement and par-
ticipation of various segments of society within these networks of civic
life, is the degree of co-operation and contact between such groups and
important civic and imperial officials and institutions. There is abundant
evidence for associations honouring on their own important civic officials,
thereby maintaining connections with powerful citizens of the polis, such
as when the therapeutai of Zeus honoured a foremost leader of Sardis for his
piety toward the deity (ISardBR 22; ca. 100 BCE).5
The institutions and inhabitants of the cities often maintained impor-
tant links with Roman imperial officials of equestrian or senatorial rank
(who could also be local notables). The involvement of associations in
imperial aspects of the honorific system further attests to some of the ways
in which they cemented their relationship with the polis, identifying with
its interests (see Harland 1999). In various cities, for example, several asso-
ciations honoured members of the prestigious Julius family, who were
descendants of Galatian royalty, entered imperial service as equestrians,
then became senators as early as the late first century CE. Julia Severa, at
Acmonia, was a high priestess in the local imperial cult, who acted as bene-
factor to both the local elders’ association (gerousia) and the group of
Judeans, for whom she built a synagogue (MAMA VI 263, 264; mid-first cen-
tury CE). Her relative, C. Antius Aulus Julius Quadratus, was a prominent
Pergamene, who reached consular rank and held important imperial posi-
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tions in various provinces of the Greek East, including the proconsulate of
Asia; he was honoured as a benefactor by various cities, including Perga-
mon. But he was also the benefactor of local associations at Pergamon,
including the young men (neoi) and the Dionysiac dancing cowherds, who
honoured him on more than one occasion (early second century CE).6 One
of his cousins, Julius Amyntianus, likely the brother of C. Julius Severus of
Ankyra, was a member in the Panhellenion institution of Athens and also,
for a time, the priest of Isis and Sarapis at Tralles, for which the initiates
(mystai) honoured him with a monument (ITrall 86; post-131 CE). Evidently,
associations and the spectrum of inhabitants who belonged to them were
very much involved in the webs of relationships that characterized civic life
and linked the polis to the empire.
Yet what is even more striking, and indicative of widespread participa-
tion in the life of the polis, are the numerous examples of various types of
associations and guilds collaborating together with the principal civic insti-
tutions (the council and the people) in honouring eminent citizens and
benefactors. This is true of the groups of Roman businessmen throughout
the cities of Asia who evidently became well integrated within the life of
the polis, as well as the various age-group organizations officially attached
to the gymnasia.7 Yet even less official occupational and other associations
joined with the political institutions in honouring benefactors.
At Smyrna, for example, the council and the people joined with a syn-
odos of initiates (probably devoted to Demeter) in honouring two female the-
ologians for their display of piety toward the goddess in providing their
services at a festival of the group (ISmyrna 653; first-second century CE). At
Thyatira, the dêmos and the Juliastai joined together to honour posthu-
mously Julius Xenon, a prominent hero and member of the polis (TAM
V 1098; first century CE). At Erythrai, the homeland (patris) and the sacred
theatrical synodos joined together in honouring Antonia Tyrannis Juliane,
the agônothetis of the great Hadrianic games (IErythrai 60; 124 CE). At Tralles,
the provincial league of Asia joined with the dêmos of Tralles and the
Dionysiac performers in honouring the association’s high priest (ITrall 65;
first century CE).
Similarly, it was common for guilds and associations to set up honours
for a benefactor on behalf of the civic institutions, often in accordance with
42 PART I • RIVALRIES?
6 For the former, see IPergamon 440; for the latter, IPergamon 486, and Conze and Schuch-
hardt 1899, 179, no. 31. On Quadratus and his family, see PIR I 507 (with family tree).
7 Cf. Adramytteion (IAdramytt 19); Acmonia (IPhrygR 533); Assos (IAssos 13–14, 19–21,
28); Apameia (IGR IV 785–786, 788–791); Iasos (IIasos 90); Tralles (ITrall 80).
02_vaage.qxd  2006/03/24  9:42 AM  Page 42
a specific provision in a decree or decision of the polis (see, e.g., IEph 728,
3079, guilds at Ephesus; IGR IV 788–791, guilds at Apameia; IGR IV 907,
leather-workers at Kibyra; Quandt 1913, 177, mystai at Sardis; ITrall 74,
mystai at Tralles). Some scholars, such as Ramsay (1895, 105–106), A.H.M.
Jones (1940, 15, 17, 43–44), and those who follow them, even suggest that
the constitutions of civic communities in Lydia may have been organized
by guilds instead of tribes (phylai); but this is not a certainty.
Even those citizens who left their native polis to pursue business and
other activities in other parts of the empire could count on the continua-
tion of attachments to their homeland and its institutions. The city from
which one came very much defined who one was in the Greco-Roman
world, as Bruce J. Malina and Jerome H. Neyrey emphasize in their 1996
study of the ancient personality. The very existence, throughout the empire,
of associations based on common geographic or ethnic origin, with corre-
sponding names, attests to the continuing importance of both civic and
regional identity.8 When the council and the people of Nysa (east of Eph-
esus and Tralles) passed a decree honouring their wealthy benefactor,
T. Aelius Alkibiades, for his love of honour (philotimia) and benefactions,
they were also sure to single out for mention his benefactions to an asso-
ciation (kollêgion) of Nysaian citizens living in Rome, who evidently main-
tained contacts with the wealthy elites and institutions of their homeland
(ca. 142 CE).9
This evidence of positive involvement by inhabitants of various social-
economic levels with civic institutions in Roman Asia suggests that the
situation in Tarsus, Cilicia, toward the end of the first century CE, is more
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8 For example, Sardians (IGR I 88–89 [Rome]); Ephesians (IGR I 147 [Rome]); Smyrnians
(IMagnSip 18 [Magnesia near Syplos]); Asians (IGBulg 480 [Montana, Moesia], IG X.2 309,
480 [Thessalonika, Macedonia]); Phrygians (IG XIV 701 [Pompeii]); Pergaians (ILindos
392 [Rhodes]); Alexandrians (IGR I 604 [Tomis, Moesia], I 800 [Heraklea-Perinthos,
Thracia], I 446 [Neapolis, Italy]); Tyrians (OGIS 595 = IGR I 421 [Puteoli, Italy]). Numer-
ous inscriptions from Delos could be cited involving Tyrians, Berytians, Egyptians, and
others (cf. IDelos 1519, 1521, 1774). On associations of Romans, see Hatzfeld 1919. See La
Piana (1927) for a discussion of various immigrant groups at Rome, including Phrygians
and Judeans.
9 Alkibiades was also a benefactor of the Roman and Asian branches of the worldwide
Dionysiac performers; their honorary inscription to him is found on the other side of the
same stone. Side A includes the Dionysiac performers’ honorary decree; and side B, the
decree of the Nysaian polis (see Clerc 1885 for both sides, IEph 22 for side A only). This
man was likely the son of Publius Aelius Alkibiades, a freedman who was prefect of the
bedchamber for emperor Hadrian, who granted him Roman citizenship (see PIR2 A134,
Robert 1938, 45–53; cf. FGrHist II 257.1–34: the father commissions P. Aelius Phlegon of
Tralles to write a history).
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an exception than the rule. There, linen-workers were consciously excluded
from participation in the polis. Dio’s response (Or. 34.21–23) indicates that
this was not a regular practice in most other cities. There certainly were occa-
sions when involvement by an association or a guild in certain activities was
perceived by either civic or Roman officials to be subversive. Examples of
such incidents in Asia Minor include the proconsul’s edict regarding the riots
of bakers in Ephesus (IEph 215, mid-second century CE; cf. Acts 19 and,
further, below) and Pliny the Younger’s dealings with associations in the
cities of Bithynia-Pontus during his special appointment as governor there
in the early second century CE (Ep. 10.33–34, 92–93, 96–97). In general,
however, these sporadic incidents have been overemphasized by many
scholars (see Harland 1999, 153–93). Ste. Croix, for example, discusses the
involvement of associations in lower-class forms of protest, such as strikes
and other disturbances, and the resulting Roman suspicion toward them;
he does not mention at all the sort of positive relations between such groups
and both civic and imperial officials which are so well attested in the
inscriptional evidence (1981, 273, 319–20). Paul J. Achtemeier correctly
looks to associations for understanding the social context of the Christian
groups addressed by 1 Peter, but wrongly oversimplifies his portrait of asso-
ciations in stating that they were a “constant problem to the governing
authorities” (1996, 25–26; cf. Balch 1981, 65–80).
The preceding evidence clearly shows that the members of many dif-
ferent types of associations, representing a spectrum of social-economic
levels within society, from the more prestigious occupations of Roman busi-
nessmen and silversmiths to the less desirable professions of dyers and
clothing cleaners, actively participated in the networks of civic life and, in
important ways, closely identified with the polis and its structures. So much,
then, for the widespread scholarly view that associations and guilds were
a replacement for the declining structures of the polis, and the equally
untenable view that they were a consistently subversive element in society,
removed from civic identity and involved primarily in negative relations with
imperial and civic authorities.
This attachment to the institutions of the polis, and the accompanying
sense of civic identity or pride, is evinced in various other ways as well,
besides involvement in civic networks of benefaction. Some of the princi-
pal social-cultural institutions of the polis, often built or renovated through
the benefactions of the wealthy, were marketplaces, baths, gymnasia, sta-
diums, and theatres. Here, too, there is clear evidence of active participa-
tion by inhabitants of the cities. The age-group organizations of girls or
boys (paides), youths (ephêboi), young men (neoi), and elders (gerousia) were
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a very prominent feature of gymnasium life for members of citizen fami-
lies. Jews also could participate in the life of the gymnasia in Asia: there was
a group of “younger Judaeans” (neoteroi Ioudaioi) at Hypaipa (CIJ 755), and
several Jewish names are included in lists of ephêboi from Iasos and else-
where (see Robert 1946, 100–101). Guilds of performers and athletes were
similarly active in the gymnasia, stadiums, and theatres, where they com-
peted during the various festivals held in honour of gods or emperors.
Yet ordinary associations and guilds also had a place (often in a literal
sense) within these institutions of the polis. The stadiums at Aphrodisias,
Didyma, and Saittai, for example, included bench reservations for guilds and
associations of various kinds (IAphrodSpect 45; IDidyma 50; Kolb 1990). Sev-
eral latrines at the Vedius bath-gymnasium complex at Ephesus were set
aside for groups of bankers, hemp-workers, wool-dealers, and linen-weavers,
all of whom evidently frequented the place (IEph 454). Quite well known
is the Jewish synagogue contained within the bath-gymnasium complex at
Sardis in the third century CE, right next door to the imperial cult hall.
Such groups could also have special seats reserved for them in the theatre
where the assembly of the people, as well as various theatrical and other
performances, took place; the theatre at Miletos included reservations for
guilds such as the “emperor-loving goldsmiths” and the “Judaeans (or
Jews) and God-fearers,” who sat just a few rows from the front, right next
to the benches reserved for the “friends of the Augusti” (philaugustoi).10
Discussion of these kinds of social-cultural institutions leads us to
another important aspect of civic life, which attests to the vitality, not the
decline, of the polis and its social-religious life: festivals, processions, and
related activities.11 As we noted earlier, the gods, rulers, and emperors were
an integral part of the webs of relations that characterized the social sys-
tems of the cities; festivals were one means by which appropriate honour
could be shown to these godly benefactors, who protected the polis and its
inhabitants. Thus, Plutarch, who was quite emphatic about the need for
moderation in the pursuit of honour (philotimia), felt that the best pretext
for benefaction was one “connected with the worship of a god [which]
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10 Unfortunately, most of the topos-inscriptions from the theatre at Miletos are as yet
unpublished; on some of these inscriptions, including the Jewish one, see Kleiner 1970,
18–20. The theatre at Aphrodisias included a bench for the butchers, alongside others
(IAphrodSpect 46).
11 For a general discussion of festivals (especially those in honour of emperors), and their
importance for all strata of society, see Price 1984, 101–32. For an excellent study of
festivals and foundations in the cities of Asia Minor, focusing on the recently discovered
Hadrianic inscription from Oenoanda (one of the most extensive festival-foundation
inscriptions yet found), see Wörrle 1988 and Mitchell 1993 (with English translation).
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leads the people to piety; for at the same time there springs up in the minds
of the masses a strong disposition to believe that the deity is great and
majestic, when they see the men whom they themselves honour and regard
as great so liberally and zealously vying with each other in honouring the
divinity” (Mor. 822b).
The pan-Hellenic festival established by Magnesia in honour of Artemis
Leukophryene in the second century BCE, after an epiphany of the goddess
and a consultation of the oracle of Apollo at Delphi (cf. IMagnMai 16, 17–87,
100), is paralleled by similar festivals, both local and regional (pan-Hellenic
or provincial), which were established in cities throughout the Hellenistic
and Roman periods. The proliferation of associations of athletes and per-
formers in the Hellenistic and, especially, Roman eras is just one clear indi-
cation of the continuing popularity and importance of festivals, and the gods
and goddesses they honoured.
To cite just one example from the Roman era, Salutaris gave a sub-
stantial financial foundation to Ephesus in 104 CE (IEph 27). The council
and the people decided that the income from the funds would be used for
processions expressing various elements of civic identity. Several groups par-
ticipated, most prominently the youths (ephêboi), who carried images not
only of Artemis and the Ionian and Hellenistic founders but also of the
emperors. As Rogers (1991, 80–127, 136–51) convincingly argues, the com-
position of the biweekly procession was an expression of the multi-faceted
identity of the city, not only encompassing the Roman imperial family and
regime but also reaffirming the Ionian origins and sacred identity of Eph-
esus as the city of Artemis. The procession, in fact, began and ended in
her sanctuary.
There is varied evidence for the continuing importance of gods and
goddesses (whose popularity was not dying, as some scholars imagine) in
the life of the polis, especially in connection with civic identity and pride.
Virtually every city chose a particular deity as benefactor and protector, to
whom proper honour was due. The relation between the civic community
and the gods was taken seriously, and any threat to this relationship was
a grave offence. The account, in Acts (19:21–41), of the silversmiths’ riot at
Ephesus, whether documenting an actual event or not, realistically portrays
the attachment that inhabitants felt to their patron deity (cf. Oster 1976).
In reaction to Paul’s preaching that gods made with hands are not gods, the
silversmiths are said to have gathered together a considerable crowd of
other craftsmen and local inhabitants in the theatre, shouting (for two
hours), “Great is Artemis of the Ephesians!” The more important of the
motives Acts mentions for this protest relates to the need appropriately to
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honour the goddess: “There is danger…that the temple of the great god-
dess Artemis will be scorned, and she will be deprived of her majesty that
brought all Asia and the world to worship her” (Acts 19:27; cf. IEph 24 [ca.
160 CE]).
The official patron deity was not the only deity, however, to whom
honour was due. Temples and altars for various gods and goddesses, both
foreign and local, dotted the cities of Roman Asia. At Ephesus, for exam-
ple, there is surviving evidence of cultic activity for Zeus, Aphrodite, Apollo,
Asklepios, Athena, Demeter, Dionysos, Cybele, Isis and Sarapis, and others;
a similar array of evidence has been found at Pergamon (cf. Knibbe 1978;
Oster 1990; Ohlemutz 1968). As well, possession of an official provincial
imperial-cult temple could be a source of rivalry among cities in Asia, as
illustrated by one particular incident Tacitus relates from the reign of
Tiberius (Ann. 4.55–56). Other local shrines or cults of the emperors, includ-
ing cultic activities practised within associations, likewise attest to the
importance of the emperors as gods within the civic system (cf. Pleket
1965; Price 1984, 190–91; Harland 1996).
The foundation and continuation of cults or associations in honour of
gods other than the patron deity of the polis were also bound up with civic
identity and well-being. An inscription from the second century CE, claim-
ing to be an ancient oracle, records the myth of the introduction of Dionysiac
associations (thiasoi) to the city of Magnesia (IMagnMai 215). It tells a story
about the people of Magnesia sending messengers to consult the god Apollo
at Delphi concerning a miraculous sign and epiphany of the god Dionysos,
which happened at Magnesia “when the clear-aired city was founded but
well-cut temples were not yet built for Dionysos” (lines 19–21). The orac-
ular response implied that the well-being of the Magnesians depended
upon an obedient response to the will of both gods, Apollo and Dionysos,
that associations devoted to Dionysos should be founded. This oracle may
have been a useful weapon in establishing the pre-eminence of these par-
ticular Dionysiac associations within the context of religious rivalries at
Magnesia at the time.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF RELIGIOUS RIVALRIES
Reference to competition, of course, brings us back to the focus of this
book. I think it appropriate to conclude this chapter by outlining a few of
its main implications for the study of different religious rivalries within
ancient civic contexts. First, when discussing and explaining religious rival-
ries, we must avoid adopting models of decline and broad notions of degen-
eration, even though such assumptions have been widespread in this area
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of study in the past. Hopefully, I have shown how pervasively and fre-
quently the predominant model of decline has, in the past, shaped our pic-
ture of the polis of the Hellenistic and Roman eras. Many recent scholars,
however, are beginning to deconstruct this scholarly edifice and build
instead a more complex picture with regard to the continuing importance
and vitality of the polis, despite changes, developments, and regional vari-
ations.
Yet conceptions of the decaying polis have also been the basis upon
which various other questionable theories have been built regarding social-
religious life and the general milieu of the Greco-Roman world—theories
and assumptions that must no longer be unquestioningly employed in our
attempts to understand and explain religious rivalries. I have tried to show
ways in which problematic modern concepts and models of historical devel-
opment have played a significant role in the formation and acceptance of
many such theories. The inscriptional evidence from Asia, which I have
discussed, has further challenged, in several ways, broad notions of decline.
To begin with, it has provided concrete illustrations of the continuing
importance of the polis and its structures as a locus of identity, co-operation,
and competition for members of various strata of society. At the same time,
it has also further undermined some of the more commonly accepted the-
ories regarding the effects on religious life of supposedly widespread feel-
ings of detachment from the civic community. Many scholars have thought
that such deracination led directly to the emergence of the private religion
of the individual, including mystery religions or associations, as a func-
tional replacement for civic structures. But we have found that, far from
being a replacement for attachment to the polis, many small social-reli-
gious groups could be integrated, though some more than others, within
the polis and its standard structures.
The second main implication of the present study is this: that the prac-
tice of competition, or rivalry, was a natural consequence of living within
the social system of the polis. Even more, the agonistic culture that consti-
tuted this social system made rivalries (as well as co-operation) essential
to its continued vitality. Within such a context, both rivalries themselves
and the potential disturbances that sometimes accompanied them should
be understood as signs of vitality, not decline.
Third, it is evident that inhabitants who joined together on a regular
basis to form small social-religious groups could indeed find the polis to be
a home. They could find their place within the polis, cement their relation-
ship with its structures, and identify with its interests in a variety of ways,
including participation in civic networks of benefaction, direct relations
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with the political organs, and participation within social and cultural insti-
tutions, including gymnasia and theatres. We also found that emperors
and imperial officials were incorporated within the civic system and its
webs of relations to such an extent that the relation of a polis to the emper-
ors was an important component of civic identity in the Roman era. The par-
ticipation of inhabitants or groups in imperial aspects of civic life provided
another way for people to stake a claim regarding their particular place(s)
within society.
Fourth, the vitality of both traditional and other forms of social-religious
life means that groups of Jews or Christians, like others, would have to
work hard to establish and to maintain their place within the polis. Despite
their peculiarities, the most important of which may have been a firm
rejection of many features of polytheistic cultic life, Jewish and Christian
groups, like other associations, could not utterly reject all participation in
and involvement with at least some of the varied social, economic, and
cultural features of civic life; at least, not if they hoped to persist. Those Jew-
ish groups that found a place (literally) within the bath-gymnasium com-
plex at Sardis, and within the theatre at Miletos, illustrate some of the
possibilities, even for putatively exclusive Jewish and Christian groups, of
finding a home within the social structures of cities in the Roman Empire.
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